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Summary. — This paper estimates the effects of external constraints on growth and investment 
in the Mexican economy, and how those effects have changed since the economic liberalization 
of the 1980s and the formation of NAFTA in 1994. Shocks to net financial inflows, world oil 
prices, the U.S. growth rate, and the real value of the peso explain most of the fluctuations in 
Mexico’s annual growth since 1979 (with structural breaks in some of these effects due to 
liberalization or NAFTA). Both Hausman weak exogeneity tests and simultaneous equations 
estimates generally support the view that growth drives investment but not the other way around, 
in the short run. Inflows of foreign direct investment have positive effects on investment, but the 
coefficients are small and their statistical significance is marginal.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Mexican economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century presents a 
fascinating paradox. On the one hand, the country appears to have achieved the macroeconomic 
stability that eluded it during the last three decades of the twentieth century. The extreme boom-
bust cycles that plagued Mexico between the 1970s and the mid-1990s have not reoccurred since 
the recovery from the peso crisis of 1994–95. Since 2003, the inflation rate has been below 5% 
per year, while the current account deficit has been held to about 1% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) or less.1 On the other hand, Mexico’s growth has been disappointing for most of the 
period since the liberalizing reforms of the late 1980s and the country’s entry into the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The late Victor Urquidi, one of Mexico’s 
greatest economists, lamented in one of his last articles that “Mexico has been in a state of social 
and economic stagnation for the last two decades” (2003, p. 561). The growth rate of real GDP 
averaged 2.8% per year during the period 1981–2006, compared with 6.4% in 1951–80.2
 The academic literature has debated many explanations for the persistently slow growth 
of the Mexican economy since the 1980s.3 Much of the literature has emphasized a variety of 
internal obstacles, such as the lack of fiscal reform, depressed public investment spending, and 
deficiencies in the rule of law. Some studies have focused on supply-side problems such as the 
low rate of total factor productivity growth, although other studies contend that the latter is a 
symptom rather than a cause of slow output growth. The existing literature also recognizes that 
Mexico operates under a number of well-known external constraints, including fluctuating world 
prices for export products (principally oil and labor-intensive manufactures), the growth rate of 
the U.S. economy (Mexico’s main export market), liberalized international flows of trade and 
investment, and competition from other emerging market nations (especially China). 
 This paper focuses exclusively on fluctuations in Mexico’s growth during the years since 
the country first opened up to the global economy by promoting oil exports and borrowing from 
international capital markets at the end of the 1970s. This choice of time period is determined 
partly by data constraints, and partly by a desire to focus on a period during which external 
constraints or “shocks” can reasonably be hypothesized to have been of decisive importance. 
Since we use data for the period 1979–2006, our analysis cannot address the question of why 
average growth has been slower during this period than it was during the previous three decades. 
Regression models, by their nature, can only explain the deviations of the dependent variable 
from its sample mean—not the mean itself. Nevertheless, the results in this paper shed light on 
the principal determinants of the wide fluctuations in the growth of the Mexican economy during 
the recent decades of slower average growth. Given the enormous volatility of annual Mexican 
growth during this period, an analysis that explains these fluctuations should have important 
implications for what is presently constraining the growth of the Mexican economy. 
 The central contention of this paper is that external constraints or “shocks” have played a 
predominant role in determining the growth rate of the Mexican economy throughout our sample 
period. Our econometric results show that Mexican growth has been tightly constrained by four 
key “external” variables: net financial inflows, defined as the sum of current transfers plus the 
financial account balance (excluding official reserve asset transactions) in the balance of 
payments; the growth rate of the U.S. economy; the world real price of oil; and the (lagged) real 
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value of the Mexican peso, taken as a measure of external competitiveness (the lagged value of 
the peso is used to avoid endogeneity problems and for other reasons discussed below). 
According to structural break tests, the effects of three of these four variables have changed 
significantly since the liberalizing reforms of the late 1980s and the formation of NAFTA in 
1994, but all four continue to explain most of the variations in Mexican growth up to 2006.  
 Furthermore, our estimates of a more complete model including an investment function 
suggest that the low rate of investment in Mexico since the 1980s is an effect, and not a cause, of 
the low rate of growth of output in the short run. Using simultaneous equations estimation 
methods, we find that the GDP growth rate has a strong and significant “accelerator” effect on 
the investment rate, but (after controlling for the external shock variables) the domestic 
investment rate has no statistically significant “multiplier” effect on the GDP growth rate. This 
finding is also confirmed by Hausman weak exogeneity tests. We also estimate the effects of 
other variables, including the real interest rate, real exchange rate, real oil prices, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), on domestic investment in Mexico. Most interestingly, although FDI 
inflows are found have a positive effect on overall investment, the estimated effects are not 
statistically significant in all equations, and the small coefficients (usually about 0.2) suggest that 
FDI has largely substituted for domestic investment.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the existing literature on 
Mexican growth and external constraints. Section 3 presents the data set. Section 4 discusses the 
econometric estimates of the growth model, while section 5 covers the estimates of the 
investment function (both using single equation methods). Section 6 then considers a variety of 
estimates using simultaneous equations methods. Section 7 presents simulations of the impact of 
the various external shock factors on the growth and investment rates. Section 8 concludes. 
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 2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 Studies of external constraints on Mexico’s growth and the effects of international shocks 
were commonplace in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the peso crisis of 1994–
95. For example, Zedillo (1986)—who was later President of Mexico in 1994–2000—conducted 
a decomposition and simulation analysis of the effects of external shocks and domestic policies 
on Mexico’s balance of payments in the 1970s and 1980s. Ros (1987) emphasized how external 
shocks in oil prices and interest rates, combined with sudden reversals of capital flows, 
precipitated the 1982 debt crisis—and how external constraints contributed to the difficulties of 
the post-crisis recovery. Lustig & Ros (1993) discussed Mexico’s efforts to reverse the outward 
resource transfers that had depressed the economy in the 1980s through measures such as the 
Brady debt relief plan of 1989 as well as structural reforms that were intended to bolster 
investors’ confidence. Prior to the 1994–95 crisis, some observers were already worried about 
the appreciation of the peso impeding export-led growth (e.g., Dornbusch & Werner, 1994). 
After the peso crisis, some analysts focused on the earlier overvaluation of the peso (e.g., 
Dornbusch et al., 1995), while others stressed the financial panic that broke out after the 
government abandoned its exchange rate peg (e.g., Sachs et al., 1996; Calvo & Mendoza, 1996). 
López Gallardo et al. (2006) applied Minsky’s theory of financial fragility to the volatility of 
financial inflows into Mexico during the 1994–95 crisis. 
 Several studies have highlighted the conflict between Mexico’s macroeconomic 
stabilization policies, which have frequently led to appreciation of the peso, and the country’s 
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reliance on exports to promote growth in the post-liberalization era.4 Alejandro Nadal aptly 
explains this conflict as follows:  
Mexico’s new economic strategy has thus far been unable to achieve economic 
growth accompanied by external equilibrium. There are many reasons for this 
situation, but the core explanation is closely related to a stabilization process that 
accords high priority to the struggle against inflation. This strategy, in turn, has 
relied heavily on a relatively restrictive stance on monetary and fiscal matters, as 
well as an overvalued exchange rate. This has led to high interest rates that have 
stifled growth and damaged Mexico’s external position.... Overreliance on the 
exchange rate to reduce inflation leads inexorably to a worsening of the trade 
balance, and it therefore runs counter to an essential component of the open-
economy model. (Nadal, 2003, pp. 57–59.) 
Ramírez de la O (2004, pp. 84–85) concurs, arguing that high interest rates in Mexico in the late 
1990s and early 2000s led to appreciation of the peso, and suggests that “currency appreciation 
may have gone too far in hurting long-term investment.”  
 A related issue that has received much attention is the disjuncture between the rapid 
growth of Mexican manufactured exports after the liberalization of trade in the late 1980s and 
the persistently slow growth of GDP since that time. One widely noted cause is the fact that 
many of the country’s export industries have become so heavily import-dependent that they 
generate few “backward linkages” to the domestic economy (see, e.g., Ruiz-Nápoles, 2004). This 
problem is most obvious in the maquiladora sector, in which imported parts and components 
account for about three-quarters of the value of exports,5 but it is increasingly true in the 
manufacturing sector as whole. Moreno-Brid et al. (2005, p. 1098) stress that, after the opening 
of the economy in the late 1980s, “few policies [were put] in place to efficiently promote 
exports,” and those that were implemented generally lacked adequate funding or were focused 
mainly on tax breaks for imported inputs.  
 Some economists have argued that Mexico has to restrain the growth of domestic demand 
(e.g., through contractionary fiscal and monetary policies) in order to prevent rising imports from 
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leading to a large trade deficit, and that this need for restraint has increased since Mexico opened 
its economy (see, e.g., Ros, 1995; Moreno-Brid, 1998; Pacheco-López & Thirlwall, 2004). 
Moreno-Brid (1999, 2002) and Pacheco-López (2005) found that Mexico experienced an 
increase in the income elasticity of its demand for imports after the trade liberalization of the 
1980s, thus reducing the growth rate consistent with balanced trade for any given rate of export 
expansion. Pacheco-López (2005) also found that the trade liberalization policies of the 1980s 
increased the long-run growth rates of both exports and imports, but NAFTA increased only the 
growth rate of imports.6 According to Pacheco-López & Thirlwall (2004) and Pachecho-López 
(2005), Mexican exports are highly elastic with respect to U.S. income in the short run. 
 Only a few studies have identified precise mechanisms through which macroeconomic 
policies have restrained growth in the more recent period. Galindo & Ros (2008) identify a bias 
toward appreciation of the peso in the operation of Mexican monetary policy since the recovery 
from the peso crisis. They find that, between 1995 and 2004, the Banco de México followed an 
asymmetrical policy in which it usually tightened monetary policy when the peso depreciated, 
but did not relax monetary policy when the peso appreciated (except in the second half of 2003, 
when the peso was allowed to depreciate from a severely overvalued level). With regard to fiscal 
policy, Ros (2006) discusses the procyclical bias in a fiscal policy that is targeted on the fiscal 
balance itself. This forces the government to cut back expenditures during economic downturns, 
when a countercyclical fiscal stimulus is needed, and also when oil prices are low (since the 
state-owned oil monopoly is a major source of government revenue).  
 A few previous studies have estimated econometric models that directly test for the 
causes of Mexico’s slow growth or low investment rate during the recent period. Ibarra (2006) 
estimates several components of a short-run macroeconometric model of the Mexican economy, 
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including equations for investment, saving, the profit share, and the growth of manufactured 
exports. Among other things, he finds that the real value of the peso has a negative effect on the 
profit share of value added (especially in tradable goods sectors), and that this in turn 
discourages real fixed investment since the latter is a positive function of the profit share. Most 
of Ibarra’s econometric estimates are confined to annual data for the period 1989 (or 1990) to 
2005, due to data limitations as well as a desire to focus on “the post-trade liberalization period” 
(2006, p. 15n8).7 Ibarra’s results need to be interpreted with caution due to the short sample 
periods and lack of attention to possible simultaneity among the various equations.8
 Galindo & Ros (2008) use cointegration analysis for a model (with quarterly data from 
1982:1 to 2003:4) that includes four variables: Mexican output, Mexican investment, U.S. 
output, and the real exchange rate (defined as the relative price of foreign goods, so that a higher 
real exchange rate indicates a depreciation). After finding at least one significant cointegrating 
vector, the authors interpret the first cointegrating vector as an equation for Mexican output. This 
equation implies positive “long-run” effects of the other three variables on Mexican output. 
However, in the impulse responses only the effects of U.S. output and Mexican investment are 
positive, while the effect of the real exchange rate is initially negative (significantly so for the 
first six quarters) and does not turn positive even after ten quarters. These results must be 
interpreted with caution, because investment is likely to be an endogenous variable, and hence 
this equation could incorporate other causal relationships between the variables (e.g., effects of 
output on investment rather than the reverse).  
 Galindo & Ros (2008) also report cointegration results for split samples before and after 
NAFTA went into effect in 1994. These results show a notably greater positive effect of real 
peso depreciation on output in 1994:1 to 2003:4 compared with 1982:1 to 1993:4, but only a 
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slightly greater effect of U.S. output on Mexican output in the post-NAFTA period. However, 
cointegration analysis conducted over such short time periods must be interpreted with even 
greater caution. In contrast, several studies using other methodologies have found large and 
significant increases in the “synchronization” of Mexican output and industrial production with 
U.S. business cycles since NAFTA (see, e.g., Chiquiar & Ramos-Francia, 2004; Lederman et al., 
2005, pp. 91-92; Mejía Reyes, et al., 2006). The results in this paper, presented below, support a 
significantly greater effect of U.S. growth, not the exchange rate, on Mexican growth after 1994. 
 In regard to longer-term obstacles to growth, many studies have argued that Mexico’s 
failure to complete its own internal reform agenda has prevented the country from taking 
advantage of the opportunities afforded by the opening to international trade and the deregulation 
of domestic markets (see, e.g., Hufbauer & Schott, 2005; Studer & Wise, 2007). Areas that are 
frequently cited as needing reform include the tax system (which relies too much on oil revenue), 
the energy sector (which is dominated by the state-owned energy monopoly PEMEX), the rule of 
law, competition policy, and reducing the cost of doing business in Mexico. These authors 
generally attribute the lack of reform to the political gridlock in Mexico’s chaotic, fledgling 
democracy, where no party has had a majority in the Congress since 1997. However, Guerrero et 
al. (2006) argue that the inability to move forward on reform is the result of deeper “structures of 
inequality and institutions”—i.e., highly concentrated wealth in the business sector and the 
corporatist social institutions created by the former ruling party—that result in suboptimal 
political outcomes. Also, some analysts have noted that the economic integration process under 
NAFTA is “shallow,” in the sense that it does not include the institutional framework, 
development assistance, and convergence policies that were adopted in the formation of the 
European Union (see, e.g., Pastor, 2001; Weintraub, 2004; Studer & Wise, 2007). 
 8 
 
 
 Analyses using a neoclassical growth accounting framework generally find that total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth in Mexico fell beginning in the early 1980s—in fact, a typical 
finding is that TFP growth was negative between 1980 and 2003.9 However, some economists 
have questioned whether the fall in TFP growth is a consequence rather than a cause of the long-
term growth slowdown. Moreno-Brid & Ros (2009) argue that standard TFP estimates are 
misleading because of changes in labor force participation rates and occupational structures. In 
their view, “the deterioration in the productivity growth performance of the Mexican economy 
since 1980 has to be seen as an endogenous consequence of the sluggish [rate of] economic 
expansion,” which made the formal economy incapable of absorbing the rapidly growing labor 
force and pushed increasing numbers of workers into low-productivity, informal service 
activities.10 Several studies have focused instead on the low overall investment rate since the 
debt crisis of the 1980s (e.g., Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2004; Ibarra, 2006). Máttar et al. (2003) note 
that the recovery of investment in manufacturing in the 1990s was concentrated in a few export-
oriented sectors dominated by foreign companies, leading to an industrial structure focused on 
the transformation or assembly of imported inputs with weak linkages to the domestic economy. 
 The more long-term oriented studies thus raise important structural issues, but do not 
address the specific constraints that have been most binding on the Mexican economy in the 
short run during the period of slower average growth since the 1980s. Some studies have focused 
on various particular constraints during this period, such as the conflict between the use of the 
exchange rate as a tool of anti-inflationary policy and for export promotion purposes. But no 
study to date has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the role of external shocks and 
constraints for the entire period since the opening of the Mexican economy, and how the effects 
of external variables were either weakened or strengthened by major policy changes such as 
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trade liberalization and the formation of NAFTA. Surprisingly, none of the recent empirical 
studies has estimated or controlled for the effects of fluctuations in oil prices, which have 
become important again in the early 2000s. Therefore, this paper will address these concerns by 
estimating a model of the effects of the four major external variables that have been identified in 
the literature (net financial flows, real oil prices, U.S. growth, and the real exchange rate). In 
addition, this paper will also investigate the feedback effects of the growth rate onto the 
investment rate via the accelerator mechanism in an investment function and try to sort out the 
direction of causality (and test for simultaneity) between investment and growth. 
 
3. DATA SET 
 
 The data set consists of annual data for 1979–2006.11 Some of our most important 
variables, especially our measure of net financial inflows (which is derived from the balance of 
payments), are not available earlier on a consistent basis from our main data source, and market 
interest rates are not available from that source before the late 1970s.12 Moreover, this sample 
period coincides with the time period since Mexico’s initial opening to the global economy via 
oil exports and international borrowing. However, we show earlier years for some series 
graphically in this section in order to put the more recent period in perspective. 
 The growth rate series13 (solid line in figure 1) illustrates the enormous volatility of 
Mexico’s economy from the 1970s through the mid-1990s. After recovering from a slowdown in 
1975–77, Mexico enjoyed a strong but short-lived oil boom in 1978–81. This was cut short by 
the sharply increased world interest rates and falling global oil prices that sparked the debt crisis 
of 1982–83. Another steep recession occurred in 1986 when oil prices fell further. The moderate 
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growth (about 4% per year) in the early post-liberalization years (late 1980s to early 1990s) 
ended in the peso (“tequila”) crisis of 1994–95; GDP fell by 6.2% in 1995. This was followed by 
a rapid recovery and brief boom in 1996–2000, a recession in 2001, and a gradual recovery 
thereafter. The last decade (1996–2006) exhibits less volatility than the preceding years, but the 
average growth rate in this period (3.7% per annum) remained disappointingly low. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 The explanatory variables for the growth rate are: 
 Net financial inflows. To capture external financial shocks, we define this variable as the 
sum of the financial account balance (excluding official reserve asset transactions) plus current 
transfers in the balance of payments. This definition is motivated by a desire to have a measure 
of financial inflows that includes remittances of migrant workers along with FDI and other types 
of foreign investment inflows (such as bank loans and portfolio capital).14 Figure 2 shows the 
volatility of these inflows, as well as how their composition has changed over time. “Other net 
financial inflows” predominated during the oil boom of 1979–81 (at which time they were 
primarily bank loans) and in the early 1990s (when they were primarily inflows of portfolio 
capital). FDI inflows increased strongly after the formation of NAFTA in 1994, but stagnated 
after 2001. Transfer payments (mainly worker remittances) surged in the 2000s, while other net 
financial inflows turned negative.15 Each of the major growth crises since 1982 (shown in Figure 
1) is associated with one of the sharp reversals in net financial inflows seen in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 The growth rate of U.S. real GDP. Since the Mexican economy has become highly 
export dependent and about 85 percent of Mexico’s exports are sold in the U.S. market, the U.S. 
growth rate is likely to be an important—and exogenous16—variable for determining Mexico’s 
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growth rate. As can be seen in Figure 1, the correlation of the two countries’ growth rates 
appears to have become stronger since the recovery from the peso crisis in 1996, although this is 
likely to be a delayed (post-crisis) reaction to the formation of NAFTA in 1994.  
 The world real price of oil. Oil prices were a major driver of cyclical swings in the 
Mexican economy during the 1970s and 1980s, and have acquired renewed importance since 
they started rising again in the 2000s.17 The variable used here is the world real price of oil, 
which is assumed to be exogenous to the Mexican economy.18 Specifically, we use the IMF’s 
average index of three internationally quoted spot oil prices (Dubai, U.K. Brent, and Texas), 
deflated by the U.S. producer price index (PPI) for industrial commodities (since oil is priced in 
U.S. dollars). The resulting real oil price index is shown in Figure 3. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 The (lagged) real value of the peso. We tried two alternative indexes for Mexico’s real 
exchange rate. The multilateral real peso index (dashed line in Figure 4) is calculated by taking 
the reciprocal of the Banco de México’s index of the real, consumer-price adjusted, multilateral 
exchange rate with 111 countries (the reciprocal is used so that a higher number indicates a real 
appreciation of the peso).19 The bilateral real U.S. dollar-peso index (solid line in Figure 4) is 
calculated by taking the ratio CPIMex/(E×CPIUS), where CPIi is the consumer price index of 
country i and E is the nominal exchange rate in pesos/dollar.20 The “maxi-devaluations” of 1976, 
1982, 1986, and 1994–95 are associated with the corresponding growth declines shown in Figure 
1. Since 2000, the real value of the peso has fluctuated within more narrow bounds, especially as 
measured by the bilateral index. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
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 For the investment function, the theoretically desired dependent variable is the rate of 
capital accumulation, i.e., the ratio of real net investment to the (end-of-previous-period) real 
capital stock. However, given the difficulties in obtaining reliable measures of depreciation and 
the capital stock for Mexico,21 we instead use the gross investment-to-GDP ratio,22 where 
investment is measured by “gross fixed capital formation.” This gives us two alternative series, 
one with the numerator and denominator both measured in nominal terms and one with both 
measured in real terms; for the latter, the denominator (real GDP) is expressed as a Hodrik-
Prescott filter of the actual series (on the presumption that a correct capital stock series would be 
much smoother than actual GDP).23 We report the regression results using the real investment 
rate, but mostly similar results (available on request) are obtained with the nominal rate.24
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 To explain the investment rate, the two most standard variables to use are a measure of 
output growth or capacity utilization (accelerator effect) and the cost of capital funds (user cost 
or real interest rate) (see Chirinko, 1993; Chirinko et al., 1999). For the accelerator effect, we 
used the real Mexican GDP growth rate shown in Figure 1. Due to data limitations, it was not 
possible to construct a user cost variable for Mexico, so the real interest rate was used instead. 
As Figure 6 shows, nominal interest rates in Mexico (measured by the three-month treasury bill 
rate25) fell from high levels in the high-inflation years of the 1980s to moderate levels in the 
2000s, while real interest rates (calculated using the percentage rate of change in the GDP 
deflator) were much lower (and frequently negative) in the 1980s and have been more stable 
(and more consistently positive) since the mid-1990s. The other variables used in the investment 
functions (real peso indexes, real oil price index, and FDI inflows) have already been shown. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
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 4. GROWTH EQUATIONS AND STRUCTURAL BREAK TESTS 
 
 Based on the preceding review of the literature and inspection of the data, we postulate 
the following equation to explain the annual growth of the Mexican economy: 
MexGrowtht = β0 + β1 FinInflowst + β2 USGrowtht + β3 RealOilt + β4 RealPesot−1 + ut    (1) 
where MexGrowth is the growth rate of real Mexican GDP, FinInflows is net financial inflows as 
defined earlier (in percent of GDP), USGrowth is the growth rate of real U.S. GDP, RealOil is 
the index of the world real price of oil, RealPeso is an index of the real value of the peso (either 
the multilateral index, RealPesoMulti, or the bilateral index, RealPesoDollar) and u is the error 
term (the subscript t indicates the year). Our hypotheses are that β1, β2, β3 > 0 and β4 < 0. 
 We use a one-year lag of the real peso index for two reasons. First, the current-year real 
exchange rate can be affected by Mexico’s growth (for example, because strong growth 
generally attracts capital inflows and may also spark higher inflation). In contrast, the previous 
year’s exchange rate can be considered pre-determined or exogenous since it cannot have been 
influenced by the current year’s growth. Second, the exchange rate affects growth primarily 
through its effects on international trade, and trade effects typically occur with so-called “J-
curve” lags due to the time it takes to order, produce, and ship goods across national borders in 
response to exchange rate changes.  
 Before estimating equation (1), we have to test for the time-series properties of the 
variables. Using a 10% significance threshold, Phillips-Peron tests show that the null hypothesis 
of a unit root can be rejected for MexGrowth, USGrowth, FinInflows, and RealPesoDollar, but 
the null must be accepted for RealOil and RealPesoMulti.26 Using the alternative test due to 
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Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), for which the null hypothesis is that the series is stationary, we can 
accept the null for all of the variables at any significance level between 1% and 10%, except the 
results for USGrowth are sensitive to the bandwidth selection method (the null can be accepted 
at all conventional significance levels using the Andrews method, but only at 1% using Newey-
West). Since most of the data series do not have unit roots according to most tests, it would be 
inappropriate to test for cointegration or use cointegration procedures.  
 Nevertheless, there is enough evidence of possible unit roots for some of the variables 
that equation (1) should be estimated using a method that is robust to the inclusion of series that 
may have unit roots. Such a method exists in the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) 
approach of Stock and Watson (1993), in which each right-hand-side (RHS) variable is entered 
both in level and first-difference form; the coefficients on the first differences control for 
dynamic adjustments to the long-run equilibrium while the coefficients on the levels are 
estimates of the long-run effects.27 Thus, the equation we actually estimate is: 
MexGrowtht = β0 + β1 FinInflowst + β2 ΔFinInflowst + β3 USGrowtht + β4 ΔUSGrowtht
     + β5 RealOilt + β6 ΔRealOilt + β7 RealPesot−1 + β8 ΔRealPesot−1 + vt  (2) 
where Δ is the difference operator and v is the error term. Our hypotheses can now be restated as 
β1, β3, β5 > 0 and β7 < 0 (we are not concerned with the signs of the differenced terms). 
 The results of estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 1. We begin with equation 
(1.1), which omits either RealPeso index. All the other variables are significant in levels and 
have the expected signs. FinInflows has a coefficient of 0.64 and is significant at the 1% level; 
RealOil has a coefficient of 0.025 and is significant at the 10% level; and USGrowth has a 
coefficient of 0.82 and is significant at the 5% level. The Durbin-Watson statistic and other 
diagnostic tests do not reveal any significant problems (except the Chow breakpoint tests, which 
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will be discussed later). When RealPesoMulti is included in equation (1.2), all the variables have 
their expected signs and appear to be significant (in levels), but the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
high at 2.461, and the RESET tests indicate significant misspecification error (at the 5% level 
using squared fitted values and the 1% level using cubed fitted values). When RealPesoDollar is 
used instead in equation (1.3), the equation passes all of the diagnostic tests for random residuals 
(there is no significant autocorrelation of the residuals according to either Durbin-Watson or 
Breusch-Godfrey, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed according to Jarque-Bera), and there is no significant misspecification bias (according 
to RESET). However, the USGrowth variable becomes insignificant in equation (1.3).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Based on the data in Figure 1 as well as our literature review, we suspect that the effects 
of U.S. growth on Mexico may have become more pronounced (and statistically significant) after 
the two countries joined NAFTA in 1994. Moreover, given the major policy shifts in Mexico 
since the 1980s, the effects of other variables on growth may also have changed during our 
sample period. As Table 1 shows, Chow breakpoint tests indicate significant structural breaks in 
1994 in equations (1.1) and (1.3) at the 5% level using the F-statistic and equations (1.1) through 
(1.3) at the 0.1% level using the likelihood ratio (LR) test.28 Therefore, we proceed to conduct a 
series of tests for structural change in the growth equation, using equation (1.3)—which has the 
best statistical properties of the first three equations in Table 1—as a baseline model. 
 The results of several structural break tests are reported in Table 2. We used two 
alternative dummies: DLiberal, which is 1 during the liberalization period (defined as 1988–
2006) and 0 otherwise;29 and DNAFTA, which is 1 in 1994–2006 and 0 otherwise. These 
dummies were employed in an interactive fashion by multiplying them times each of the 
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variables in the growth model.30 Although we used DOLS estimation, the coefficients on the 
differenced variables are not reported here for reasons of space (complete results are available on 
request). Thus, the coefficients shown in Table 2 are the coefficients on the levels of the 
variables, which in a DOLS specification capture long-run effects.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 In equation (2.1), the interactive variable DNAFTA*USGrowth is positive and significant 
at the 5% level (p-value of 0.013), while the plain USGrowth variable is insignificant, thus 
indicating that U.S. growth had a significant effect only after NAFTA was adopted.31 Since 
estimates with insignificant variables included are inefficient, we re-ran the equation omitting 
USGrowth (without the dummy) and including only the interactive term DNAFTA*USGrowth. 
The long-run coefficients are reported in column (2.2) of Table 2 and—since this ends up being 
our preferred specification for reasons indicated below—complete results (including differenced 
variables) are also given in column (1.4) of Table 1. In this equation, all variables are significant 
and have their expected signs in levels. FinInflows, RealOil, and RealPesoDollar are significant 
at the 1% level, while DNAFTA*USGrowth is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the 
latter variable implies that a 1 percentage point change in the U.S. growth rate causes the 
Mexican growth rate to change by 0.53 percentage points in the same direction, but only after 
NAFTA went into effect. This equation also finds a strongly positive effect of FinInflows (0.68) 
and a negative effect of lagged RealPesoDollar (−0.16). The included variables explain 86% of 
the variation in the Mexican growth rate during the sample period, while the diagnostic tests 
indicate no problems with the residuals or specification.  
 Then, using equation (2.2) as a new baseline model, we proceed to test for structural 
breaks in the effects of the other independent variables.32 In equation (2.3), the significant 
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negative coefficient on DLiberal*FinInflows indicates that there was a significant reduction in 
the effect of net financial inflows after 1988 (a similar test using DNAFTA, not shown in the 
table, does not find a significant change in the effect of this variable after 1994). In equation 
(2.4), the significant negative coefficient on DLiberal*RealOil indicates that there was a 
significant lessening of the impact of oil prices after 1988 when, in addition to liberalizing its 
trade, Mexico had begun to export more manufactures than oil (a similar test using DNAFTA, 
not shown in the table, also finds a significant change in the oil price effect after 1994). Both of 
these variables (FinInflows and RealOil) continue to have significant, albeit reduced, effects after 
1988.33 However, both equations (2.3) and (2.4) show evidence of serial correlation of the 
residuals in the high Durbin-Watson statistics and some of the Breush-Godfrey LM tests (see 
notes a and b to Table 2), leading to uncertainty about the validity of the hypothesis tests for 
these equations. 
 Finally, columns (2.5) and (2.6) of Table 2 report tests for whether either the trade 
liberalization of the late 1980s or the formation of NAFTA in 1994 increased the sensitivity of 
the Mexican growth rate to the real exchange rate. Although the estimated coefficients on the 
interactive dummy terms have negative signs in both of these equations, indicating stronger 
negative effects, both coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. Thus, our 
findings for structural breaks in the growth equation can be summarized as follows: U.S. growth 
became significant only after NAFTA went into effect in 1994; both net financial inflows and oil 
prices began to have smaller (but still statistically significant) effects after Mexico’s liberalizing 
reforms of the late 1980s; and there were no statistically significant changes in the effects of the 
real exchange rate. 
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5. INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
 
 Turning to the investment function, a convenient baseline specification that is relevant for 
the structural conditions of Mexico is the following (ignoring lags for simplicity at this point): 
InvRatet = α0 + α1 MexGrowtht + α2 ΔRealInterestt + α3 RealPesot + α4 RealOilt
  + α5 FDI-GDP Ratiot + εt       (3) 
where InvRate is the real investment rate (real gross capital formation as a percentage of Hodrik-
Prescott-filtered real GDP), MexGrowth represents the accelerator effect, ΔRealInterest is the 
change in the cost of capital funds (as noted earlier, the data required to construct the 
theoretically preferred user cost of capital are not available), FDI-GDP Ratio is FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP (the darkest shaded area in Figure 2), ε is the error term, and the other 
variables are defined as before. The interest rate variable is entered in differenced form because 
it affects the desired stock of capital, and investment is the change in the capital stock (see 
Chirinko et al., 1999; Campa and Goldberg, 1999). The expected signs on MexGrowth and 
ΔRealInterest are α1 > 0 and α2 < 0. 
 A real exchange rate index is included because, in an open economy, relative prices of 
foreign and domestic goods can be important determinants of the national location of investment 
(see Campa and Goldberg, 1999; Blecker, 2007). In general terms, a higher value of the home 
currency makes the home country a less competitive location for the production of traded goods, 
because it makes local inputs relatively more expensive, but it also cheapens imports of capital 
and intermediate goods that are used in local production and therefore can stimulate investment 
in activities that are intensive in those imported inputs. Hence, the net effect of the real exchange 
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rate on total investment (the sign of α3) is ambiguous a priori (and is likely to differ between 
industries with different structural characteristics). We also include the real oil price index 
because, historically, investment in Mexico has been highly correlated with oil prices due to the 
leading role of the oil industry in government finances and hence in financing public investment 
(which is included in the data for “gross fixed capital formation” used here to represent total 
investment).34 We also include FDI inflows (normalized by GDP) to test whether (or to what 
extent) FDI has positively contributed to total investment.35
 With regard to stationarity, InvRate has a unit root according to a Phillips-Peron test at a 
10% significance threshold, although the p-value is only 0.126. In contrast, the Kwiatkowski test 
shows that InvRate is stationary at all conventional significance levels (the LM statistic is 0.132, 
with a 10% critical value of 0.347). MexGrowth and ΔRealInterest are stationary according to 
both tests at all conventional significance levels. The two real peso indexes are both stationary 
according to Kwiatkowski tests at all significance levels, but according to Phillips-Peron only 
RealPesoDollar is stationary at the 10% level (p-value of 0.098; RealPesoMulti has a p-value of 
0.123). RealOil, as noted earlier, has a unit root according to Phillips-Peron but is stationary 
according to Kwiatkowski. The FDI-GDP ratio has a unit root according to Phillips-Peron, and 
using Kwiatkowski it is stationary at the 1% level but not at 5% or 10% with an intercept only 
(with a trend also included, it is significant at 1% and 5% but not 10%).  
 Although these tests suggest that unit roots are not likely to be a major concern in the 
investment function (3)—especially in estimates that omit the FDI-GDP ratio—we are unable to 
reject unit roots unambiguously for some of the variables. Therefore, we begin by estimating (3) 
using DOLS, which (as noted earlier) yields robust estimates of long-run relationships in the 
presence of possibly nonstationary variables. This means that we must include the differences of 
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all the RHS variables in the estimated equation. The best estimates were obtained using 0 to 2 
lags of ΔMexGrowth and 0 to 1 lags of Δ(DLiberal*ΔRealInterest) and ΔRealOil; for the other 
variables only the contemporaneous difference (0 lag) was used. For the real exchange rate, we 
use RealPesoDollar rather than RealPesoMulti, since the former shows less evidence of a unit 
root, and also because using the latter results in more evidence of serially correlated residuals 
and specification bias (although the estimated coefficients using RealPesoMulti are qualitatively 
similar to those found using RealPesoDollar). 
 Three alternative DOLS estimates of equation (3) are shown in columns (3.1) to (3.3) of 
Table 3. Only the long-run coefficients (coefficients on the levels of the variables) are shown in 
this table for reasons of space (complete results including the differenced variables are available 
on request). In equation (3.1), which omits the FDI-GDP ratio and includes the differenced real 
interest rate for all years (i.e., with no interactive dummy), ΔRealInterest is negative but not 
significant at the 10% level. This equation also has other problems, including first-order serial 
correlation of the residuals (according to the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey 
tests for one and three lags) and likely equation misspecification according to the RESET test 
with cubic fitted values (significant at 0.1%).  
 We surmise that the insignificant effect of the real interest rate and other problems may 
be due to the inclusion of data from before the period of financial liberalization, when investment 
finance was largely government controlled.36 Therefore, in column (3.2), we estimate an 
analogous equation in which the interest rate is interacted with the liberalization dummy 
variable, DLiberal, defined earlier. The interactive variable DLiberal*ΔRealInterest is negative 
and significant at the 0.1% level, implying that real interest rates began to affect investment only 
after Mexico began to liberalize its economy. In equation (3.2), the accelerator effect 
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(MexGrowth) is strong and significant (coefficient of 0.68), RealPesoDollar is also positive and 
significant (signifying that the benefits of cheaper imports of capital and intermediate goods 
outweigh the disadvantages of higher domestic costs), and RealOil is also positive and 
significant (all at the 0.1% level). However, this equation is still marred by serially correlated 
residuals (with one lag) and likely misspecification bias. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 FDI inflows are incorporated in equation (3.3) in Table 3, which preserves the interactive 
liberalization dummy on ΔRealInterest. While the other coefficients have similar estimated 
coefficients and standard errors (and p-values) to those found in equation (3.2), the FDI-GDP 
ratio is positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient is only about 0.2, however, 
indicating that FDI inflows have a relatively small impact on total investment. Including FDI 
inflows eliminates the serial correlation of the residuals, but not the misspecification bias that is 
still found according to the cubic RESET test. Since the p-value for the FDI-GDP ratio is barely 
below 10% (0.098), we must be cautious in assessing whether this is truly a significant effect. 
 Since all of the DOLS estimates show strong evidence of misspecification bias in the 
cubic RESET tests, and since there was only weak evidence of nonstationarity problems in the 
investment function to begin with, we re-estimate it using a simpler distributed-lag specification 
with the following lag structure:37
InvRatet = α0 + MexGrowth∑
=
2
0
1
i
iα t−i + DLiberal∑
=
1
0
2
j
jα t−j *ΔRealInterestt−j + α3 RealPesot  
  + α4 RealOilt + α5 FDI-GDP Ratiot + νt  .     (4) 
 Results of estimating three different versions of (4) are shown in columns (3.4) to (3.6) in 
Table 3 (the coefficients shown for MexGrowth and DLiberal*ΔRealInterest are the sums of the 
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coefficients α1i and α2j, respectively, which represent the long-run effects; additional lags of 
these variables were not significant). The results are qualitatively similar to those found in the 
parallel equations (3.1) to (3.3), but the estimated coefficients (other than the constant) in 
equations (3.4) to (3.6) are mostly somewhat smaller in absolute value than the analogous 
estimated coefficients in (3.1) to (3.3)—especially for the interest rate effects (which are 
significant only at the 10% level in equation 3.5 and at the 5% level in 3.6). The estimated effect 
of the FDI-GDP ratio is only slightly higher in equation (3.6) compared with (3.3) (0.25 versus 
0.22), and again is significant only at the 10% level (p-value of 0.083). In equation (3.6), 
however, we once again find serially correlated residuals according to the Breusch-Godfrey test 
with two lags. At best, FDI inflows appear to have only a small and uncertain impact on the 
overall investment rate in Mexico, after controlling for the other determinants of domestic 
investment. 
 In all of the last three columns in Table 3, there is only weaker evidence for equation 
misspecification (the cubic RESET statistics are significant at the 10% level, but not at 5%), and 
in two of these equations (3.4 and 3.5) we find no evidence of serially correlated residuals. 
Consequently, although we were unable to find a perfect specification of the investment 
function, we have greater confidence in the accuracy of the hypothesis tests for the distributed 
lag equations compared with the DOLS estimates, and the fact that two different specifications 
yield qualitatively similar results gives us greater overall confidence in our estimates.38  
 
6. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS ESTIMATES 
 
 Either equation (3) or (4) when combined with equation (2) (or any permutation thereof 
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involving interactive dummy terms) constitutes a special type of simultaneous equations system 
known as a “triangular” or “recursive” system, since in the former equations the investment rate 
is a function of an endogenous variable (the growth rate), but the growth rate is assumed not to 
depend on the investment rate in the growth equations. Whether this is a valid specification is 
discussed further below; first we consider whether the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
these equations in the previous two sections yield reliable (i.e., unbiased and consistent) 
results.39 OLS estimates of a recursive system of equations are consistent and unbiased, provided 
that the residuals from the equations are not correlated (see Greene, 1997, pp. 715–16, 732, 736–
37). To test whether the preceding estimates are consistent and unbiased, therefore, we used 
Breusch & Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests40 for correlation of the OLS residuals 
for various pairs of growth and investment equations from Tables 1 and 3, respectively. These 
tests (results of which are available on request) show that none of the residuals from any pairs of 
growth and investment equations are significantly correlated at the 10% level.41 This indicates 
that the OLS estimates of these equations do not exhibit significant cross-equation correlation of 
the residuals, and hence are unbiased and consistent. 
 The second set of simultaneity issues has to do with whether the recursive model is a 
correct specification of the short-run relationship between growth and investment. It might be 
thought that the investment rate, considered as an important indicator of domestic demand 
shocks, should be included in the growth rate equations. This would essentially add a Keynesian 
“multiplier” effect in the (output) growth equation to the accelerator effect found in the 
investment function. To address this question, we first used Hausman weak exogeneity tests.42 
These tests showed that MexGrowth is weakly exogenous in the InvRate equation (the residuals 
from the first-stage regression for MexGrowth are insignificant in the second-stage regression for 
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InvRate), while InvRate is not weakly exogenous in the MexGrowth equation (the residuals from 
the first stage regression for InvRate are significant at the 1% level in the second-stage 
regression for MexGrowth).43 These results suggest that InvRate is a function of MexGrowth but 
MexGrowth is not a function of InvRate. 
 As a further test for the direction of causality between growth and investment, we 
consider a specification of the growth model in section 4 in which InvRate is included in the 
equation for MexGrowth. Combined with one of the investment functions from section 5, this 
gives us a truly simultaneous system, which we can use to test for whether InvRate is significant 
in the MexGrowth equation (in which case, the correct model would be simultaneous and not 
recursive—and the growth equations without InvRate would also suffer from omitted variable 
bias). In the presence of true simultaneity, OLS estimates are biased even if the residuals are 
uncorrelated. Therefore, we estimated various pairs of growth and investment equations, with the 
former modified to include InvRate, using two-stage least squares (2SLS). In all cases, the 2SLS 
residuals were not significantly correlated according to Breusch-Pagan tests.44 Therefore, the 
2SLS results are unbiased and consistent, and it is not necessary to use three-stage least squares. 
 Results of two typical pairs of 2SLS regressions are shown in Table 4. These estimates 
combine our preferred specification of the growth equation (column 1.4 in Table 1, which is the 
same as column 2.2 in Table 2),45 with InvRate added in as a regressor, along with two 
alternative investment functions, one excluding and one including the FDI-GDP ratio 
(essentially, equations analogous to columns 3.5 and 3.6 from Table 3). Both pairs of equations 
(columns 4.1a-b and 4.2a-b) satisfy the rank and order conditions for identification of the 
parameters. All the exogenous and lagged variables in both pairs of equations were used as 
instruments for each set of estimates. Due to the small sample size, we were unable to obtain 
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precise estimates using the DOLS approach, i.e., with the differenced RHS variables included.46 
Therefore, we included only the levels of the RHS variables (sensitivity tests showed that this did 
not substantially change the estimated coefficients on the variables in levels, but notably reduced 
the standard errors of those estimated coefficients). Similarly, we used the distributed lag version 
of the investment function rather than the DOLS specification, especially since the latter also had 
problems of serially correlated residuals and misspecification bias. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 In equations (4.1a) and (4.1b) in Table 4, the estimated coefficients on the other variables 
are not much changed, compared to equations (1.4) and (3.5) in Tables 1 and 3 respectively, as a 
result of the inclusion of InvRate in the MexGrowth equation (as well as the use of 2SLS and the 
omission of the differenced variables)—although the real interest rate becomes insignificant in 
the investment equation (4.1b). The coefficient on InvRate, while positive, is not significant at 
the 10% level (p-value of 0.188). These results indicate that growth equation (1.4) did not suffer 
from significant simultaneity or omitted variable bias, and that the recursive model consisting of 
that equation along with (3.5) for investment is superior to the simultaneous model (4.1a-b).  
 One qualification is that, in the simultaneous estimates of equation (4.1a), the coefficient 
on RealOil—in addition to dropping about half in value relative to equation (1.4)—is statistically 
insignificant (p-value of 0.248). We suspect that this results from the high correlation of the real 
oil price with the investment rate: the simple correlation coefficient between these two variables 
is 0.56, and RealOil is positive and significant in all the estimated InvRate equations. Given the 
close correlation of these two variables, it may be impossible to definitively tease out their 
respective effects on growth, and hence our conclusion of no simultaneity must be interpreted 
with caution. However, since the world real oil price index is exogenous to the Mexican 
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economy, the strong correlation of that index with the investment rate suggests that investment is 
driven by oil prices and not the other way around, and hence the exogenous variable whose 
shocks really drive growth is the oil price and not the investment rate. 
 Equations (4.2a) and (4.2b) in Table 4 repeat the same exercise, but including the FDI-
GDP ratio as a regressor in the investment equation. In these estimates, the FDI-GDP ratio was 
treated as an endogenous variable, with its lagged value included in the instrument list for the 
2SLS procedure (but qualitatively similar results were obtained when this ratio was treated as 
exogenous). The results show that the FDI-GDP ratio retains its positive coefficient, which is 
now about double the previous estimates from Table 2 (roughly, 0.4 versus 0.2), but this ratio is 
insignificant in the 2SLS estimates (p-value of 0.119). This suggests further caution in assessing 
the impact of FDI inflows on total investment. In this last set of estimates, InvRate is significant 
in the MexGrowth equation (4.2a) at the 10% level (p-value of 0.073). Although this might 
suggest that the simultaneous equations model is valid, this result is found only in a two-equation 
model that includes an insignificant variable (the FDI-GDP ratio) in the equation for the 
endogenous variable InvRate; furthermore, there is still multicollinearity between this variable 
and RealOil, and InvRate is not significant in the growth equation at the 5% level. 
 Thus, the preponderance of evidence suggests that investment in Mexico is a function of 
growth but not vice-versa, i.e., the relationship is one-way and not simultaneous, in the short run. 
Put another way, there is strong evidence for an accelerator effect of growth on investment, but 
no robust evidence for a multiplier effect of investment on growth. While this finding may seem 
surprising, it suggests the persistent strength of external constraints on economic growth in 
Mexico during our sample period. External shocks, rather than domestic events, appear to have 
driven the fluctuations in Mexico’s growth since the early 1980s, and even “internal” variables 
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such as investment seem to be heavily influenced by some of those same external variables 
(including the indirect effects on investment of the external shocks that affect the growth rate). 
Of course, these results do not preclude the possibility that the low average investment rate may 
have contributed to the slow average growth in the post-1980 period, but tests for that hypothesis 
would require a different methodology. 
 
7. SIMULATED EFFECTS 
 
 Assuming that the recursive DOLS/OLS estimates are the correct ones, it is a simple 
matter to simulate the quantitative impact of shocks to the main exogenous variables on domestic 
growth and investment. In the top part of Table 5, we simulate the “long-run” (i.e., equilibrium) 
effects of a one standard deviation increase in each exogenous variable on each of the two 
endogenous variables. For this purpose, we use equation (1.4) from Table 1 for growth and (3.6) 
from Table 3 for investment (in order to be able to estimate FDI effects). The variables whose 
standard deviations have the largest impact on the growth rate are net financial inflows (+2.3 
percentage points) and the real dollar-peso index (−2.3 percentage points). Next in quantitative 
importance is the real oil price index (+1.8 percentage points), followed by the U.S. growth rate 
(+0.6 percentage points). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 For the investment rate, the largest impact factor (including both direct effects and 
indirect effects via the growth rate) is the oil price index, followed by net financial inflows 
(which have only an indirect effect through growth); these effects are +2.0 and +1.4 percentage 
points, respectively. One standard deviation changes in the other exogenous variables have only 
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small net effects on the investment rate. Notably, for the real dollar-peso index, the negative 
indirect effect via the growth equation is greater than the positive direct effect in the investment 
equation, resulting in a negative net impact of real peso appreciation on the investment rate 
(although this negative net effect is relatively small). 
 To assess the importance of external shocks during the most recent decade, the bottom 
part of Table 5 shows the simulated long-run (equilibrium) effects of the changes in the 
exogenous variables between the recovery period of 1996–2000 and the slower growth period of 
2001–6. For this simulation, while we continue to use equation (3.6) for investment, we utilize 
equation (2.4) for growth in order not to exaggerate the importance of oil prices in the more 
recent period.47 These results are estimates of the equilibrium effects assuming that the changes 
in the averages for the exogenous variables between the two periods are permanent; hence, these 
estimates should not be interpreted literally as predictions of the actual changes between these 
two time periods, because those changes were influenced by lags and short-run dynamics.  
 According to these simulations, the increased real value of the peso has the largest 
negative impact on the Mexican growth rate between 1996–2000 and 2001–6 (−1.3 percentage 
points), while the reduction in the U.S. growth rate reduces Mexican growth by −1.2 percentage 
points and lower net financial inflows cut the growth rate by −0.6 percentage points. The 
increased world oil price between these two periods is estimated to have imparted a boost of +1.3 
percentage points to the growth rate, thus offsetting only part of the negative effects (although a 
higher estimate is obtained if we use a growth equation without a structural break on the oil price 
effect). These simulations also show that the increase in world oil prices between 1996–2000 and 
2001–6 had a strongly positive long-run effect on the investment rate (+1.8 percentage points, 
including both direct and indirect effects), while  reduced net financial inflows and slower U.S. 
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growth had smaller negative effects (−0.4 and −0.8 percentage points, respectively). Changes in 
the other variables (the real dollar-peso index, real interest rate, and FDI-GDP ratio) had 
negligibly small net effects on investment between those periods. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This article has found evidence that most of the variation in Mexico’s growth rate since 
1979 can be explained, parsimoniously, by shocks to four external factors: net financial inflows, 
world oil prices, U.S. growth, and the lagged real exchange rate. The first three are clearly 
exogenous with respect to the Mexican growth rate (as verified by Hausman weak exogeneity 
tests, available on request), while the last one can be considered exogenous because it is lagged 
in the regression model (and the real exchange rate is “external” in the sense that it reflects 
Mexico’s price competitiveness in foreign trade). Tests for structural breaks show (subject to 
some uncertainty about the hypothesis tests due to residual autocorrelation) that the post-1988 
economic liberalization policies reduced, but did not eliminate, the constraining effects of net 
financial inflows and oil prices on Mexican growth, while the formation of NAFTA in 1994 
created a significant dependency of Mexico’s growth on U.S. growth that did not exist 
previously. We found that there was no statistically significant change in the effect of the real 
exchange rate either post-liberalization or post-NAFTA, although the coefficient estimates are 
consistent with the view that the negative effects of peso appreciation may have become slightly 
more pronounced. 
 Real oil prices, the FDI-GDP ratio, and changes in real interest rates have the expected 
effects on the investment rate (positive, positive, and negative, respectively), but all of these 
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effects vary in statistical significance depending on the specification of the investment function. 
The real value of the peso has a positive direct effect on investment, but this effect is roughly 
cancelled out (in some estimates, more than cancelled out) by the negative indirect effect via the 
growth rate. We also found that the real investment rate in Mexico is subject to a strong and 
significant accelerator (growth) effect, but according to most of our tests there is no statistically 
significant reciprocal effect of the investment rate on the growth rate in the short run. In other 
words, the causality in the Mexican macroeconomy appears to go from external shocks to growth 
to investment, with no significant feedback (multiplier effect) of investment on short-run growth. 
This suggests an economy that, after two decades of market-oriented reform efforts, remains 
heavily dependent on external forces as the motor of its expansion and highly vulnerable to 
adverse external shocks (e.g., a future U.S. recession or possible fall in oil prices).  
 Of course, these results need to be heavily qualified to the extent that they explain only 
the variations in Mexico’s short-run growth since the early 1980s, and not the long-run decrease 
in the average growth rate during this period compared with earlier decades. However, the results 
in this paper do suggest a new direction for future research on the causes of the long-term growth 
slowdown. Previous research (cited earlier) suggests that Mexico’s economic opening of the 
1980s and beyond made it more constrained by its balance of payments and other external 
conditions than it was in the preceding decades, and this paper verifies the strength of those 
external factors during the post-1980 period. Further research is needed, however, to determine if 
the increased exposure to external constraints since 1980 has been one of the causes of the 
longer-term growth slowdown.  
 The results in this paper also have important implications for policy efforts aimed at 
boosting the growth of the Mexican economy. Obviously, Mexico is too small to influence truly 
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exogenous variables such as U.S. growth or world oil prices. Mexico could, however, seek to 
renegotiate NAFTA or alter its other trade and industrial policies in ways that would promote 
industries with higher domestic content (i.e., greater backward linkages). Mexico has important 
decisions to make about the future of its energy sector in light of dwindling exploited reserves 
and the potential for future volatility in energy prices. Mexico could try to modify its monetary 
and exchange rate policies so as to target a lower real value of the peso, if this could be done 
without reigniting high inflation or sparking another financial crisis. Mexico also can pursue 
financial policies that avoid destabilizing fluctuations in net financial inflows. In fact, those 
inflows have been less volatile since the late 1990s, but they have also trended downward since 
that time. Perhaps most importantly, Mexico needs to reconsider what kinds of structural reforms 
and policy approaches would best enable the country to relax its external constraints and become 
less vulnerable to external shocks. 
 Finally, although our results suggest that growth drives investment and not vice-versa in 
the short run, nothing in this paper denies that a low rate of capital accumulation could be a 
significant factor in the slow long-run (average) growth of the Mexican economy since 1980. 
However, if that is the case, our results imply that policies that could stimulate growth in the 
short run would also have a long-run payoff, insofar as encouraging more investment in the short 
run leads to a larger capital stock embodying new generations of technology in the long run. In 
other words, Mexico may not be able to achieve a better long-run growth trajectory unless it 
finds a way to stimulate the economy more independently of external constraints in the short run. 
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1 Based on data from International Monetary Fund (2007a); inflation data are for changes in consumer prices. 
2 If we ignore the worst years of the debt crisis and focus on the period since Mexico began to liberalize its foreign 
trade, its growth rate averaged 3.1% per year in 1987–2006. Data for 1951–80 are from Urquidi (2003, p. 562, Table 
15.1); the later data are from our own data set described in section 3, below. 
3 See section 2 below for citations to relevant studies. 
4 See, for example, Ros (1995) and Blecker (1996). 
5 Data on maquiladora exports and imports were obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática (INEGI, www.inegi.gob.mx).  
6 Ibarra (2006) finds that a dummy variable for NAFTA’s entry into effect in 1994–95 has a positive effect on the 
growth rate of manufactured exports, but the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level and he does not estimate 
a parallel equation for imports. 
7 Ibarra uses data for the gross operating surplus of producers in Mexico’s national income accounts that are only 
available beginning in 1988. Ortiz C. (2005) constructs indexes of profitability in the Mexican economy for longer 
periods (up to 1950–2002) by using the differences between the growth rates of labor productivity and real wages. 
8 Also, Ibarra measures investment as the percentage rate of growth of real fixed investment, while it is more 
common to measure investment as a ratio to the capital stock (or, if reliable capital stock estimates are not available, 
as a ratio to GDP), and his investment function does not control for the cost of capital funds (real interest rate). 
9 See, e.g., Faal (2005), cited in Moreno-Brid & Ros (2009). 
10 Moreno-Brid & Ros (2009); cited with permission of the authors and Oxford University Press from page 204 of 
the manuscript dated July 2007. A related argument holds that Mexico has failed to invest enough in human capital. 
However, Moreno Brid & Ros (2009) point out that educational attainment indicators for Mexico have risen 
substantially since 1980, and that there seems to be underutilization of educated labor. They also argue that, to the 
extent that educational expenditures have been inadequate, this has been an effect of the macroeconomic crises and 
the fiscal stabilization policies used to address them, rather than an exogenous cause of slower growth.  
11 Given our interest in what might be termed the “medium-run” performance of the Mexican economy, i.e., over 
periods of a few years (including lagged effects), rather than very short-run fluctuations, quarterly data would be 
likely to add more noise than information, in spite of their potential to increase the number of observations. Also, the 
Mexican quarterly data that are available for most series are generally not seasonally adjusted.  
12 Most data series in this paper were taken from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Online, hereafter referred to as “IFS,” except as otherwise noted. The IFS data for Mexico’s balance of payments 
start in 1979. The Banco de México website (www.banxico.gob.mx) contains older data for the balance of 
payments, but the pre-1980 data are not completely consistent with the later data, and the IFS evidently does not 
consider the earlier data to be of equivalent quality. 
13 The growth rates (annual percentage changes) were calculated from the “volume index” for real GDP in the IFS. 
This index splices together constant-peso series derived from different base years.  
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14 Traditionally, net resource transfers are defined as the balance of trade for goods and services with the sign 
reversed; this concept was used in some of the studies of Mexico’s external financial flows discussed earlier. 
Hausman tests (available on request) verify that both net resource transfers and net financial inflows (measured as 
percentages of GDP) are weakly exogenous in the growth model, and the coefficient estimates from the growth 
regressions are very similar (both qualitatively and quantitatively) using the two variables, so none of the substantive 
results in the paper depend on this difference in definition. However, (again measured as percentages of GDP) net 
resource transfers have a unit root according to a Phillips-Peron test, while net financial inflows as defined here are 
stationary according to the same test. Also, using net resource transfers in the growth equations leads to 
misspecification bias according to Ramsey RESET tests (all of these estimates and tests are available on request). 
Thus, the definition used here is preferred on statistical grounds. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2007b, 
Statistical Appendix, Table B18)—which offers its own (different) measure of “net external financing”—states that, 
“It should be noted that there is no generally accepted standard definition of external financing” (p. 28n5). 
15 IFS data on total unilateral current transfers received go back to 1979, while Mexican government data on 
“remesas familiares” (family remittances) go back only to 1995. However, based on the data for the overlapping 
years (1995–2006), it is clear that the vast majority of transfers (well over 90%) are remittances. 
16 U.S. bilateral trade with Mexico is so small in relation to U.S. GDP that Mexico’s growth is unlikely to have an 
appreciable impact on U.S. growth. As of 2004, U.S. exports of goods and services to Mexico represented 1.1% of 
U.S. GDP, while U.S. imports of goods and services from Mexico accounted for 1.5% of U.S. GDP (calculated from 
data obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov).  
17 The value of Mexico’s oil exports more than doubled from US$18.6 billion in 2003 to US$39.0 billion in 2006. 
Source: INEGI, Banco de Información Económica, Sector externo, Exportaciones petroleras y no petroleras, 
http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVJ100005, and author’s calculations. 
18 Actual oil revenue may be partly endogenous to the growth process insofar as the government-run energy 
monopoly (PEMEX) adjusts its export strategy in response to economic conditions. See Puyana (2006) on Mexican 
oil policy and how it has responded to various economic and fiscal incentives. 
19 We used the series, “Índice de tipo de cambio real (ITCR), con precios consumidor y con respecto a 111 paises,” 
based at 100 in 1990 (from Banco de México, www.banxico.gob.mx). In addition to taking the reciprocal, we 
calculated annual averages of the monthly data and converted to a 2000 base year. 
20 The bilateral peso-dollar real exchange rate index was constructed using consumer price indexes for comparability 
with the multilateral real exchange rate index from the Banco de México. Although in principle a producer price 
index (PPI)-based real exchange rate might be a better measure of the relative price of tradable goods, the Mexican 
PPI for non-oil commodities shows an anomalous large drop-off in 1981, which results in a parallel anomalous 
movement in the real exchange rate. 
21 The Mexican government has not published an official capital stock series in several years. Loría and de Jesus 
(2007) cite a Banco de México series that was discontinued after 2003, as well as previously published critiques of 
the methodology used for that series. Loría and de Jesus (2007) provide their own estimates of quarterly capital 
stocks from 1980:1 to 2004:4 based on the perpetual inventory method. However, these estimates have several 
problems: (1) they show an implausibly large decline in the capital stock during the debt crisis of the 1980s that is 
not fully reversed until after 2000; (2) the estimated capital stock appears too highly correlated with the current flow 
of investment; and (3) the estimates imply a large increase in capital productivity (the output-capital ratio) between 
1980 and 2000 that is not found in any other research.  These problems seem to derive from an excessively large 
adjustment to the capital stock series for the initial periods. 
22 Note that using the investment-GDP ratio essentially assumes a constant capital-output ratio or unchanged capital 
productivity—an assumption that is neutral but untestable, given the lack of capital stock data described in the 
preceding note. 
23 The Hodrik-Prescott filter was applied using a power value of 4, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). This 
results in a trend that better approximates the medium-run cycles in Mexican output, as compared with a power 
value of 2 (as originally suggested by Hodrik and Prescott, 1997) which results in a smoother, more long-run trend. 
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24 The main differences in the results using the nominal investment rate are that the real peso indexes are never 
significant and there is significant serial correlation of the residuals. Also, the FDI variable is insignificant in some 
specifications with the nominal investment rate. All other coefficient estimates are similar. 
25 The IFS provides a series called the “average cost of funds” starting in 1975, but this series did not have good fits 
in the regression equations. The treasury bill rate is available starting in 1978, and had better fits in the regression 
equations. Besides, the latter rate is a good proxy for monetary policy in Mexico, and is therefore more likely to be 
exogenous in an investment equation than a longer-term, bond-market rate. 
26 The null can be rejected at the 1% level for the two growth rates, but only at the 10% level for FinInflows (p-value 
of 0.055) and RealPesoDollar (p-value of 0.098). Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were not used because they have 
low power to reject the null of a unit root in short samples. Results of all unit root tests are available on request. 
27 We use the term “long-run” here in its standard sense in time-series econometrics, i.e., the period in which the 
lagged effects of an independent variable work themselves out and the dependent variable adjusts to its new 
equilibrium level, following a shock to an independent variable. This period, which is on the order of a few years in 
the models in this paper, is not as long as the “long run” contemplated in growth theory, which is on the order of 
decades or longer. Thus, our use of the term “long-run” in relation to the econometric results is not intended to deny 
the essentially short-run nature of the present analysis. 
28 Similar tests for a break in the late 1980s at the time of Mexico’s internal reforms and initial trade liberalization 
could not be conducted due to the small number of observations for the pre-reform subsample. 
29 Although the choice of any particular year as the beginning of the liberalization period is inevitably arbitrary, 
1988 was chosen for several reasons. First, it was around the middle of the period 1986-1990 when many of the 
most drastic liberalization measures were taken, starting from Mexico joining GATT in 1986 and culminating with 
the privatization of state-owned banks in 1990. Second, one of the most definitive studies of Mexico’s reforms cites 
1988 as the year in which the government began to have success in reducing inflation, adopted a series of important 
banking reform measures, and “consolidated” its efforts at trade liberalization (see Lustig, 1998, pp. 51, 108, 117). 
30 We also tested using DLiberal and DNAFTA as intercept dummies in the growth equations. The results, which are 
available on request, show that both of these intercept dummies are generally insignificant, and that their signs and 
magnitudes are highly sensitive to which other variables (i.e., interactive terms) are included. 
31 In all the regressions shown in Table 2, the coefficient on the plain variable is an estimate of the effect before the 
structural break, while the coefficient on the interactive variable is an estimate of the change in the coefficient after 
the break (hence, the p-value for the interactive dummy shows the significance level of the break). A similar test 
using DLiberal*USGrowth also finds a significant structural break, but only at the 10% level (p-value 0.069).  
32 Due to the small sample size, each interactive dummy term was tested separately (in addition to the 
DNAFTA*USGrowth variable).  Equations using more interactive dummies at once generally had severely 
autocorrelated residuals and other statistical problems. 
33 The coefficient for FinInflows for 1988–2006 is 0.635 with a standard error of 0.108 (p-value 0.000); the 
coefficient for RealOil for 1988–2006 is 0.026 with a standard error of 0.008 (p-value 0.004). 
34 It was decided not to focus on private investment due to the tremendous shift in the composition of total fixed 
capital formation from the public to the private sector during our sample period. The share of private investment 
rose from 57.0% of the total in 1980 to 82.9% in 2006 (INEGI data from Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009, Table 8.1), and 
we did not want to confuse the determinants of total investment with the causes of this compositional shift.  
35 FDI includes acquisitions of significant shares of existing enterprises by foreign investors, and hence the degree to 
which it actually contributes to capital formation is uncertain a priori. In Mexico, some of the largest FDI inflows 
have been for acquisitions rather than greenfield investment. 
36 Also, the large inflationary shocks of the 1980s led to volatile swings in the real interest rate (see Figure 6) that 
may not have had predictable effects on investment expenditures. 
37 This specification essentially assumes that the growth rate and change in the real interest rate affect the desired 
capital stock based on adaptive expectations, whereas the other variables affect the financing of investment flows in 
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the short run (see Chirinko et al., 1999, on the distinction between variables that affect desired capital stocks and 
variables that affect financial or “liquidity” constraints).  
38 We also tried investment equations including a lagged dependent variable along with distributed lags of the 
independent variables, i.e., an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. The results, which are available on 
request, yield qualitatively similar results to equations (3.4) through (3.6) in Table 3, except that RealOil becomes 
insignificant, the lags of MexGrowth also become insignificant, and the FDI-GDP ratio is insignificant when 
included. The ARDL specification does not solve the problem of significant RESET tests for equation 
misspecification (the cubed residuals are significant at the 5% level), and exhibits very large residuals during the 
debt crisis years of the 1980s (perhaps because lagged InvRate is not a good predictor of current InvRate during that 
volatile period). 
39 The DOLS procedure is really just a special application of OLS, and hence all the statements about OLS here also 
apply to the DOLS estimates. 
40 The Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic is 
, 
where n is the number of observations, m is the number of equations, ρij is the correlation coefficient between the 
residuals of the ith and jth equations, and (under the null hypothesis of no cross-equation correlation) λ is distributed 
as a χ2[0.5m(m−1)]. With two equations (m = 2), this statistic reduces to λ = nρ2, where ρ is the correlation of the 
residuals from the two equations, and λ ∼ χ2(1). 
41 Equation (1.2) from Table 1 was omitted because the RESET tests indicated equation misspecification, and 
because RealPesoMulti was not used in any of the investment functions in Table 3. Otherwise, residuals from all 
possible combinations of equations from Tables 1 and 3 were tested and found to be uncorrelated. 
42 These tests were conducted using equation (1.4) for MexGrowth and (3.5) for InvRate, from Tables 1 and 3, 
respectively (except, when testing for exogeneity of InvRate in the MexGrowth equation, we added the level and 
first difference of InvRate into equation 1.4). In the first stage regression, the RHS variable whose exogeneity is 
being tested is regressed on all the exogenous variables in the equation plus additional instruments for the variable in 
question, and the residuals are saved. For InvRate, the instruments we used were 0 to 2 lags of MexGrowth and 
contemporaneous ΔRealInterest; for MexGrowth, the instruments were FinInflows, DNAFTA*USGrowth, and 
lagged RealPesoDollar (RealOil is already included in the equation). Then, in the second-stage regression, the 
original equation is re-run with the first-stage residuals included as a regressor, and the null hypothesis is that the 
residuals are insignificant (implying weak exogeneity). Details of these regressions are available on request. 
43 Hypothesis tests for the Hausman procedure are conducted using the standard normal distribution. For the 
MexGrowth residuals in the InvRate equation, the t-statistic is 1.27, which is less than the 2-sided 10% critical value 
of 1.64 (so the null is accepted). For the InvRate residuals in the MexGrowth equation, the absolute value of the t-
statistic is 2.68, which is greater than the 2-sided 1% critical value of 2.58 (thus, the null is rejected).  
44 Results of these Breusch-Pagan tests are not given here for reasons of space, but are available on request.  
45 Equation (1.4), which is the same as (2.2), is preferred to equation (2.3) or (2.4) because of the serially correlated 
residuals in the latter two. Also, since adding InvRate as a regressor takes away an additional degrees of freedom 
from a model with a small sample size, it is desirable to use a baseline model with fewer other regressors. 
46 The differenced variables cannot be used as instruments in the 2SLS estimation because they are endogenous; 
therefore, lagged values of the variables were used as instruments instead. This resulted in a large number of 
endogenous variables relative to the sample size, which in turn led to very large standard errors and insignificant 
coefficients on most of the RHS variables.  
47 Although we do not use equation (2.3), which allows for a structural break in the effects of net financial inflows, 
the coefficient on FinInflows in equation (2.4) is 0.545, which is less than the coefficient on this variable for the 
post-liberalization period implied by equation (2.3) (which would be 1.101 – 0.466 = 0.635). Thus, the estimates 
reported here for the effects of net financial inflows are conservative. 
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Equation: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Constant -4.817 3.197 6.050 8.704
(0.092) (0.163) (0.105) (0.003)
FinInflows(t)  0.640  0.716  0.850  0.678
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
ΔFinInflows(t)  0.214 -0.013 -0.082 -0.017
(0.118) (0.917) (0.544) (0.908)
RealOil(t)  0.025 0.038  0.035 0.042
(0.061) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002)
ΔRealOil(t)  0.042 0.046  0.052 0.032
(0.125) (0.005) (0.015) (0.206)
USGrowth(t)  0.821 0.617  0.402 0.530a
(0.030) (0.003) (0.220) (0.024)
ΔUSgrowth(t) -0.397 -0.196 -0.098 0.711a
(0.049) (0.309) (0.702) (0.176)
RealPeso(t-1)b -0.110 -0.132 -0.158
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
ΔRealPeso(t-1)b  0.063  0.083  0.118
(0.047) (0.089) (0.000)
R 2 0.686 0.816 0.790 0.858
Adjusted R 2 0.592 0.734 0.697 0.795
SE 2.198 1.774 1.896 1.559
SSR 96.60 56.67 64.71 43.75
Durbin-Watson 1.876 2.461 2.150 2.019
Diagnostic tests (p -values):
Jarque-Bera Normality 0.522 0.525 0.938 0.873
Breusch-Godfrey LM test (2 lags) 0.578 0.348 0.420 0.821
RESET (squared fitted values) 0.608 0.045 0.407 0.537
RESET (cubed fitted values) 0.118 0.007 0.341 0.751
Chow Breakpoint (F-statistic)c 0.039 0.174 0.024
Chow Breakpoint (likelihood ratio)c 0.001 0.001 0.000
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p -values (significance levels) using Newey-West adjusted 
standard errors. Equations were estimated using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS); 
coefficients on the levels of the independent variables measure long-run effects. 
aIn equation (1.4) this variable is interacted with DNAFTA, which is 1 in 1994-2006 and 0 otherwise.
bMeasured by RealPesoMulti in equation (1.2) and RealPesoDollar in (1.3) and (1.4).
cTests were performed for a break in the first year of NAFTA (1994). Tests for a liberalization
break starting in the late 1980s could not be performed due to insufficient observations for earlier
years. This test cannot be calculated for equation (1.4) due to the inclusion of the interactive 
NAFTA dummy.
Table 1.   DOLS estimates of growth equations
Dependent variable: MexGrowth(t); Sample period: 1980-2006 (27 annual observations)
Equation: (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
FinInflows(t)  0.649  0.678 1.101  0.545  0.661  0.533
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.033)
DLiberal(t)*FinInflows(t) -0.466
(0.000)
RealOil(t)  0.042 0.042 0.026 0.042 0.029  0.036
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.016) (0.005)
DLiberal(t)*RealOil(t) -0.016
(0.015)
USGrowth(t) -0.099
(0.638)
DNAFTA(t)*USGrowth(t)  0.574 0.530  0.555  0.714 0.623  0.982
(0.013) (0.024) (0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.022)
RealPesoDollar(t-1) -0.162 -0.158 -0.168 -0.120 -0.126 -0.103
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.026) (0.120)
DLiberal(t)*RealPesoDollar(t-1) -0.020
(0.131)
DNAFTA(t)*RealPesoDollar(t-1) -0.023
(0.153)
R 2 0.859 0.858 0.892 0.902 0.870 0.866
Adjusted R 2 0.770 0.795 0.825 0.841 0.789 0.782
SE 1.650 1.559 1.442 1.373 1.580 1.608
SSR 43.56 43.75 33.27 30.16 39.96 41.38
Durbin-Watson 2.041 2.019 2.634 2.466 2.236 2.329
Diagnostic tests (p -values)
Jarque-Bera Normality 0.884 0.873 0.850 0.716 0.807 0.883
Breusch-Godfrey LM test (2 lags) 0.834 0.821 0.120a 0.197b 0.701 0.536
RESET (squared fitted values) 0.454 0.537 0.128 0.207 0.639 0.385
RESET (cubed fitted values) 0.640 0.751 0.311 0.451 0.878 0.659
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p -values. A constant and first differences of all independent variables were also
included in each regression.  DLiberal is 1 in 1988-2006 and 0 otherwise; DNAFTA is 1 in 1994-2006 and 0 otherwise.
aFor 1 lag, the p -value is .044, indicating significant serial correlation.
bFor 3 lags, the p -value is .079, indicating significant serial correlation.
Table 2.   Tests for structural change in growth equations (long-run coefficients)
Dependent variable: MexGrowth(t); Sample period: 1980-2006 (27 annual observations)
Equation: (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
Constant  4.204  5.098  4.730 6.876 7.122  7.292
(0.016) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MexGrowth  0.576  0.676  0.680  0.563  0.586  0.626
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DLiberal*ΔRealInterest -0.041a -0.089 -0.085 -0.015a -0.025 -0.025
(0.231) (0.001) (0.000) (0.202) (0.065) (0.044)
RealPesoDollar  0.118  0.106  0.101  0.091  0.088  0.076
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RealOil 0.021  0.020  0.024  0.017  0.018  0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
FDI-GDP Ratio 0.219  0.248
(0.098) (0.083)
R 2 0.971 0.978 0.982 0.929 0.929 0.935
Adjusted R 2 0.945 0.959 0.959 0.903 0.903 0.906
SE 0.660 0.570 0.567 0.907 0.907 0.895
SSR 5.656 4.223 3.536 15.635 15.635 14.432
Durbin-Watson 1.239 1.408 1.657 1.667 1.605 1.797
Diagnostic tests (p -values):
Jarque-Bera Normality 0.818 0.266 0.248 0.662 0.686 0.859
Breusch-Godfrey LM test (2 lags) 0.123b 0.212c 0.532 0.444 0.355 0.083
RESET (squared fitted values) 0.188 0.307 0.322 0.609 0.457 0.587
RESET (cubed fitted values) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.093 0.067 0.067
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p -values (significance levels) using Newey-West adjusted standard errors. Equations (3.1) to (3.3) 
were estimated using DOLS; differences of the variables were also included but are not shown here (see text for details). Equations
(3.4) to (3.6) were estimated using OLS with distributed lags; coefficients shown for MexGrowth are the sums for 0 to 2 lags and
coefficients shown for DLiberal*DRealinterest are the sums for 0 and 1 lag (with p -values based on F -tests).
aThe interactive dummy variable DLiberal (for the liberalization period 1988–2006) is omitted in this equation. 
bFor 1 and 3 lags, the p -values are .041 and 0.039, respectively, indicating significant serial correlation.
cFor 1 lag, the p -value is .080, indicating significant serial correlation.
Table 3.  Estimated investment functions (long-run coefficients)
Dependent variable: InvRate(t); Sample period: 1981-2006 (26 annual observations)
Equation: (4.1a) (4.1b) (4.2a) (4.2b)
Dependent Variable: MexGrowth InvRate MexGrowth InvRate
Constant  1.351 6.479  0.054  6.862
(0.731) (0.000) (0.989) (0.000)
FinInflows(t)  0.550  0.473
(0.019) (0.033)
RealOil(t)  0.021  0.018  0.015  0.021
(0.248) (0.001) (0.387) (0.000)
DNAFTA(t)*USGrowth(t)  0.502  0.460
(0.036) (0.046)
RealPesoDollar(t)  0.097  0.077
(0.000) (0.001)
RealPesoDollar(t-1) -0.162 -0.171
(0.000) (0.000)
InvRate(t)  0.571  0.740
(0.188) (0.073)
MexGrowth (sum of t, t-1, t-2)a 0.505 0.583
(0.000) (0.000)
DLiberal*ΔRealInterest (sum of t, t-1)a -0.023 -0.023
(0.310) (0.299)
FDI-GDP Ratio(t)b 0.392
(0.119)
R 2 0.788 0.925 0.800 0.930
Adjusted R 2 0.738 0.898 0.753 0.899
SE 1.763 0.931 1.712 0.925
SSR 65.268 16.45 61.531 15.397
Jarque-Bera Normalityc 0.971 0.468 0.986 0.746
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p -values (significance levels).   Each pair of equations (4.1 and
4.2) was estimated using 2SLS; all exogenous and predetermined variables in both equations were
used as instruments (i.e., all variables except InvRate(t), MexGrowth(t), and FDI-GDP Ratio (t)).
aWald tests were used to calculate p -values based on chi-square statistics for sums of coefficients.
bTreated as an endogenous variable; the lagged FDI-GDP Ratio (t-1) was used as an additional
instrument in equations (4.2a-b).
cThis is the p -value for the null hypothesis of multivariate normality, using the Lutkepohl 
orthogonalization method (Cholesky of covariance).
Table 4.  Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of simultaneous equations models
Sample period: 1980-2006 (27 annual observations)
Table 5.  Simulated Effects
Growth Rate Investment Rate
One standard Eq. 2.2 Growth Eq. 3.6 Investment
Sample period 1979-2006a deviation change × LR Coeff. = effect × LR Coeff. = effect
Net financial inflows 3.387 0.678 2.297 0.626 1.437
U.S. growth rate (1994-2006) 1.124 0.530 0.596 0.626 0.373
Real oil price - effect on growth 42.790 0.042 1.810 0.626 1.133
           direct effect on investment 0.019 0.833
           total (net) effect on investment 1.965
Real dollar-peso index - effect on growth 14.718 -0.158 -2.325 0.626 -1.455
           direct effect on investment 0.076 1.124
           total (net) effect on investment -0.331
Real interest rate (1988-2006) 13.115 -0.025 -0.326
FDI-GDP ratio 1.046 0.248 0.259
Change in Eq. 2.4 Growth Eq. 3.6 Investment
Changes from 1996-2000 to 2001-2006b variable × LR Coeff. = effect × LR Coeff. = effect
Net financial inflows -1.072 0.545 -0.585 0.626 -0.366
U.S. growth rate -1.690 0.714 -1.206 0.626 -0.755
Real oil price - effect on growth 49.652 0.026 1.299 0.626 0.813
           direct effect on investment 0.019 0.966
           total (net) effect on investment 1.779
Real dollar-peso index - effect on growth 10.503 -0.120 -1.262 0.626 -0.790
           direct effect on investment 0.076 0.802
           total (net) effect on investment 0.013
Real interest rate 0.148 -0.025 -0.004
FDI-GDP ratio 0.112 0.248 0.028
Source: Author's calculations.
Notes: "LR" means long-run.
aExcept as indicated, where other years were used due to structural breaks.
bDifference between the averages for each period.
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Figure 1. Mexican and U.S. growth rates of real GDP, 1970-2006. Source: International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
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Figure 2. Net financial inflows and their composition, as percentages of GDP, 1979-2006. 
Sources: IMF, IFS; and author’s calculations
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Figure 3. World real oil price index, 1970-2006. Sources: IMF, IFS; and author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4. Indexes of the real value of the peso, 1970-2006. Source: Banco de México 
(www.banxico.gob.mx); IMF, IFS; and author’s calculations.
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Figure 5. Nominal and real investment rates, 1970-2006. Sources: INEGI (www.inegi.gob.mx); 
and author’s calculations. 
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Figure 6. Nominal and real treasury bill interest rates, 1979-2006. Sources: IMF, IFS; and 
author’s calculations. 
